Peer Reviewed Publications
2023. "Counter-Insurgency Strategies and Transnational Attacks by Rebel Groups." (with Victor Asal, and J. Michael Greig. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.
International attacks by rebel groups are an historically important phenomenon. Yet, few scholars have sought to understand why some rebel organizations “go abroad” and commence international attacks and some do not. We theorize that a rebel group’s decision to attack internationally is partly the result of its home-state’s counter-insurgency strategy. Home-states that employ broad-based repression discourage rebels from engaging in international attacks. By contrast, home-states that employ narrowly targeted repression accelerate rebel decisions to attack internationally. Finally, concessions by the home-state are a sufficient condition for the rebel groups in our data to never attack internationally.
2023. "Forever Wars: Divided Government and the Termination of Interventions in Support of Civil War Governments." British Journal of Politics and International Relations.
Why do third-party states continue interventions in support of governments fighting civil wars even when continuing to do so appears futile from a military standpoint? To answer this question, we focus on third-party state domestic politics, theorising that institutional characteristics condition the likelihood that the third party will terminate support to a civil war government before a conflict ends. When a third-party state’s legislature and executive branches are controlled by opposing political parties, the third party’s executive is more likely to remain committed to an intervention in order to deny political opponents the opportunity to seize on the withdrawal as a basis for political advantage. To test this expectation, we assemble a data sample of third-party interventions in support of civil war governments during the period 1975–2009. The analysis suggests that the third-party divided government reduces the likelihood of an early termination of its support for a civil war government. Our analysis underscores the role of third-party domestic politics in understanding the dynamics of internationalised civil conflicts.
2022. "Why Do Leaders Build Walls? Domestic Politics, Leader Survival, and the Fortification of Borders." Journal of Conflict Resolution.
States around the world are fortifying their international borders at unprecedented rates. While only seven states had fortified their borders with walls or fences as of the end of World War Two, this number has now grown to more than 75. Why do states build walls on their international borders? While states may build walls to ameliorate the consequences of cross-border economic inequalities and to defend against transnational security threats, we suggest that another compelling logic stems from domestic politics and leaders’ desire to remain in office. Building on assumptions furnished by diversionary theory, we argue that national political leaders at risk of losing office are incentivized to implement popular policies, such as border wall construction, hoping that doing so will prompt a domestic rally effect. To test this argument, we assemble a global dataset of leader-years and find that politically insecure leaders are more likely to be seen to start and continue border wall construction.
Replication files: CLICK HERE.
2021. "Why Some Rebel Organizations Target Americans." (with Victor Asal, Amira Jadoon, and J. Michael Greig). Defence and Peace Economics.
Hating America – and attacking Americans – can seem like a mandatory activity for rebels; yet, only a minority of rebel groups actually harm Americans. Under what circumstances do rebel groups target Americans? To answer these questions, we leverage the Big Allied And Dangerous 2 data – Insurgency subsample (BAAD2-I). Our model focuses on two classes of rebel motives: direct and indirect. Direct motives are those in which Americans play a central role in rebel group grievances. They include ideology, deployment of American troops, and American support for rebels’ government-based opponents. Indirect motives are those that encourage anti-American attacks because of their powerful symbolic value. This distinction speaks to ongoing policy debates within the United States about the most effective policy instruments to defeat extremism abroad. Contrary to common perceptions, we find that attacks on Americans are unrelated to group ideology. Instead, deployment of American troops and military assistance is positively associated with attacks on Americans, as is economic penetration. Conversely, rebel groups in countries with substantial exports to the US or featuring a long-term presence of American cultural artifacts are less likely to attack Americans. Our findings highlight the value of a ‘soft power’ orientation in American foreign policy.
2021. "Playing the Ethnic Card: Diversion, Transborder Ethnic Ties, and Support for Rebel Movements." (with Benjamin Jones). Journal of Global Security Studies.
Under what circumstances do third-party states oppose governments that marginalize their ethnic kin in foreign civil conflicts? We argue that the effect of transborder ethnic ties on third-party support for rebel movements depends upon two factors: (1) a constellation of ethnic power relations in which an ethnicity with access to political power in a potential intervener but is marginalized in a civil conflict state; and (2), the political insecurity of leaders in a potential intervener. Said leaders facing a high probability of removal from office are willing to undertake risky foreign policies, including support for rebel movements, hoping that such actions will generate an ethnically-tinged rally effect. We draw upon the literature on diversionary theory to develop an empirical expectation. We then assemble a dataset of potential intervener-civil conflict state dyad-years to model this expectation. The political insecurity of leaders is measured with a variety of proxies. Our findings suggest that the well-known diversionary theory can be applied to a novel dependent variable, that of third-party state sponsorship of rebel movements.
Replication files: CLICK HERE.
2020. Teaching About Oppression and Rebellion: The "Peasants Are Revolting" Game. (with Victor Asal, Charmaine Willis, and Nakissa Jahanbani). PS: Political Science and Politics.
Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote that “Man is born free, but is everywhere in chains.” Whereas the former claim of the quote is contestable and gendered, the latter part is empirically true from slavery to economic exploitation and widespread oppression that occurs to this day. Nevertheless, history shows that rarely will people take up weapons and rebel against the powerful. We have found that students often do not understand why this should be the case, given the rights that all people deserve. We use the Peasant Game exercise in class to shine a light on why most people, most of the time, endure repression and choose not to rebel. The game is played in turns with some students as lords, who decide how “food” will be apportioned, and other students as peasants, who produce the food. We discuss how power differentials occur and the difference they make. Students who play the game come away with a better understanding of why many people decide not to fight back against oppression—even if it is the right thing to do.
2020. "Preventive Medicine: Domestic Repression and Foreign Revolutionary States." Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict.
Do governments repress in order to defend themselves against the threat posed by the geographic proximity of victorious rebel forces? I theorize that the victory of rebel forces in armed conflict, and the subsequent creation of a revolutionary regime, provides a model for mobilization to would-be rebels and that this, in turn, leads government authorities to deploy domestic repression in order to defend themselves. This relationship is conditional upon the international assertiveness of revolutionary regimes, as well as their geographic proximity to the threatened state. Revolutionary regimes that provide assistance to foreign rebels are regarded as more threatening by status-quo states, as are those that are geographically proximate. I undertake a data analysis of state-year patterns of repression and find significant support for my theoretical expectations. My findings have implications for the study of counter-revolution, supporting the notion that state repression is, in part, a function of international threat.
2020. "Electoral Integrity and Election-Related Conflict." (with Idean Salehyan). Democracy and Security.
Why are some elections contested with social unrest and protest – sometimes violent – while others pass with little conflict? We focus our study on two types of election, each of which is defined with respect to different types of fraud: “unfree elections,” or those in which elites manipulate electoral laws and institutions, and “unfair elections,” or those in which elites manipulate votes and voters during the campaign. Unfree elections are not correlated with conflict events because the effects of electoral law are felt diffusely and manipulated electoral law is a show of elite strength. Unfair elections, by contrast, provide a highly visible focal point that allows the opposition to mobilize while simultaneously signaling elite weakness. Finally, citizens form expectations about freeness and fairness over time, engaging in conflict behavior when they perceive a deterioration in electoral fairness. We test these expectations on a sample of African, Central American, and Caribbean states during the period 1990–2011. Our findings identify those types of election fraud most likely to correlate with election-related conflict and violence.
2020. Do walls work?: The effectiveness of border barriers in containing the cross-border spread of violent militancy. (with Alex Braithwaite). International Studies Quarterly.
Since the end of the Cold War, walls, fences, and other border fortifications have been constructed on interstate borders at a rapid rate. It remains unclear, however, whether these fortifications provide effective security. We explore whether border fortifications provide security against the international spread of violent militancy. Although barriers can reduce the likelihood that militant activity diffuses across international borders, their effectiveness is conditional upon the roughness of the terrain on which they are built and the level of infrastructure development in their proximity. Barriers require intensive manpower to monitor and patrol, and so conditions like rough terrain and poor infrastructure render security activity more difficult. However, rebels and other militants prefer to operate in such difficult areas, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of barriers in containing the international spread of violent militancy. Analyses on newly collated data on interstate border fortifications within a global sample of contiguous-state directed-dyad-years show that border fortifications are only effective in limiting the diffusion of militancy in contexts in which states can plausibly monitor and police their borders. This paper has significant implications for the academic literatures on national security and intrastate conflict, and it also speaks to the broader policy debate over border walls and fences.
2019. Curbing Enthusiasm? Democratic Third Parties and Commitment to Civil War Governments (with Andrew J. Enterline and Steven R. Liebel). Democracy and Security. DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2019.1675262.
Democracies are capable of committing exceptional resources toward interventions on behalf of governments threatened by
civil war. Yet, the security benefits obtained from interventions are often indirect, decisive outcomes remain elusive, and fatalities of military personnel salient to the public. These qualities of intervention can lead a democratic publics to pressure
political leaders to end to an intervention. To avoid these political costs while still pursuing foreign policy goals, democratic
policymakers may respond by altering their intervention strategy by shifting from the deployment of combat personnel
to less politically costly modes of support. To explore the possibility of this shift, we rely on the External Support
Project–Primary Warring Party Dataset to operationalize commitment during instances of third-party support of civil war
governments for the period 1975–2009. The analysis suggests that democracies engaged in intervention build commitment
over time. However, we find that democracies are reluctant to commit combat troops to an intervention and, if they do, are
unlikely to maintain this commitment. Instead, democratic third parties resort to other forms of support. In general, the
analysis demonstrates the key role of third-party domestic politics in interventions into civil wars.
2019. Keeping Threat at Arm's Length: Counter-Revolutionary Interventions by Third-Party States in Support of Governments (with Angela D. Nichols and Andrew J. Enterline). Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict. 12(3): 223--241.
During the 1970s the military juntas in South America engaged in a cross-national campaign of repression, code-named Operation Condor, targeted against leftist militant groups inspired to action by the Cuban Revolution. This case illustrates an understudied motivation for third-party intervention in domestic conflict: counter-revolution. We therefore formulate a theory in which revolutions shock the international system by empowering new revolutionary regimes that, in turn, inspire dissidents abroad to take up arms. Status quo elites in foreign states seek to staunch this diffusion of revolution by engaging in international repressive campaigns, manifested as third party intervention in civil conflict. We test this expectation on a global sample of intervention opportunities for the period 1975–2004, and assess the threat that revolutionary regimes pose to status quo governments in two ways: (1) the geographic proximity of a revolutionary state to pairs of status quo states; and (2) the geographic proximity of internal-armed conflicts featuring rebels that are supported by a revolutionary states. We find evidence that status quo states respond to the proximity of a revolutionary state, but not to the proximity of support for rebels.
2017. Shaken or stirred? Terrorism and third-party state resolve in civil war interventions (with Andrew J. Enterline and Steven R. Liebel). Conflict Management and Peace Science. DOI: 10.1177/0738894217740874.
Does terrorism against third-party state interveners affect their willingness to continue an intervention into a civil war? Drawing on research examining the impact of terrorism on partisanship, public opinion, and political survival, as well as the targeting of states by terrorists, we link terrorist attacks originating from a civil war state with an intervening state’s resolve to continue an ongoing military intervention into a civil war in support of the government. Terrorism can either undermine a third party’s resolve, because the political costs resulting from terror attacks are perceived to be larger than the national security benefits advertised in support of an intervention or it can fortify a third party’s resolve to continue an intervention because it produces a domestic rally effect that raises the political costs of early departure. Event history analysis of 127 interventions with military personnel into civil conflicts on the side of the government during the 1975–2005 period indicates that terrorist campaigns shake the resolve of third-party states and reduce time to their departure.
2017. Third Party State Domestic Politics & Conflict Management During Interventions into Civil Conflicts (with Andrew J. Enterline and Steven R. Liebel). Social Science Quarterly. DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12426
Objective: When do third party states engaged in military support of civil war governments resort to conflict management, such as negotiation or mediation, with rebels? Current research underemphasizes the role of third party state domestic conditions as precipitating the resort to conflict management. To do so, we formulate two explanations linking third party state domestic politics to conflict management with rebels: (1) gambling for resurrection, in which a weak third party state leader eschews conflict management in the pursuit of a victory that will rehabilitate their political survival; and (2) cutting losses, in which a weak third party leader resorts to conflict management to reduce the domestic political costs associated with continued fighting. Method: We identify a sample of 32 civil conflicts during the 1960–2004 period in which a third party state deploys troops to defend a central government against a rebellion. We code the timing of negotiation and mediation offers between the third-party and the rebels. We then rely on third party state economic conditions as a barometer of the political survival that shapes the third party’s resort to conflict management. Results: A logit analysis supports the cutting losses expectation that third party states seek conflict management when political survival at home is at risk. Conclusion: The analysis underscores the necessity of incorporating the domestic politics of third party states in studies of interventions into civil wars and conflict management attempts therein.
2016. Dangerous Lessons: Rebel Learning and Mobilization in the International System. Journal of Peace Research 53(5): 633-647.
Contemporary research on the international diffusion of civil conflict privileges physical, proximity-based variables like conflict spillover and refugee flows. I argue that the international diffusion of civil strife can occur through a learning mechanism, and that this phenomenon may occur on a worldwide basis. Individuals most likely to rebel, or proto-rebels, may learn about the utility of rebellion before mobilizing and violently challenging the state. Such international learning therefore occurs during the pre-conflict process. International sources by which proto-rebels learn include active, ongoing civil wars, as well as revolutionary governments that have been founded by rebels victorious in past wars. Revolutionary governments radically shock the international system, teaching proto-rebels about the possible benefits to be gained from violently challenging the state. In order to test these assertions, I undertake empirical analyses using militant organization data that capture the year in which rebel movements first emerge, during the period 1968–2001. I then explore the spatial and temporal relationships between rebel movement emergence, civil conflict, and revolutionary regimes, using the country-year as my unit of analysis. I further examine how these relationships are attenuated by cultural and regime-type similarity. I find, in line with the literature, that active civil conflicts generally inspire rebel mobilization only in directly neighboring states, while revolutionary regimes established after rebel victories are associated with mobilization on a global basis. I conclude that proto-rebels learn and take inspiration from some global sources of information, and that significant analytical utility is to be gained by focusing on revolutionary regimes established as a result of rebel victories, as well as mobilization in the pre-conflict process.
2015. Civil War Diffusion and the Emergence of Militant Groups, 1960-2001. International Interactions 43(3): 583-600.
In this research note, I argue that scholars of the international diffusion of civil conflict would benefit from directly measuring rebel mobilization prior to the onset of civil war. To better understand the way in which international processes facilitate dissidents overcoming the collective action problem inherent in rebellion, I focus on militant organizations and model the timing of their emergence. I use several datasets on militant groups and violent non-state actors, and rely on Buhaug and Gleditsch’s (2008) causal framework to examine how international conditions predict militant group emergence. While Buhaug and Gleditsch conclude that civil war diffusion is primarily a function of internal conflict in neighboring states, once militant group emergence is substituted in the dependent variable, I observe that global conditions affect rebel collective action. A final selection model links militant groups with civil conflict onset, and demonstrates the variable performance of diffusion effects. The results indicate that many rebels mobilize in response to more global events, and then escalate their behavior in response to local conditions.
Replication files (.ZIP archive containing do-file, log file, and data in .DTA format): click here to download
2015. Elections and Social Conflict in Africa, 1990-2009 (with Idean Salehyan). Studies in Comparative International Development. 50(1): 23-49.
Proponents of democratization often claim that liberal institutions have a palliative effect on the level of conflict within societies. Critics, however, suggest that the instruments of democracy, especially elections, can spark political violence, particularly in weakly institutionalized settings. Using the newly available Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), we examine the relationship between executive elections and social conflict in Africa for the period 1990–2009. We also assess the conditions which make elections more or less violent. We examine elections in (1) countries faced with armed conflict, (2) post-conflict settings, (3) elections in autocracies, and (4) in relatively poor countries. We also look at characteristics of elections themselves, including the margin of victory, the presence of observers, and allegations of vote fraud. Results show that while elections can sometimes spark violence, free and fair elections in genuinely democratic contexts are much less conflict prone, while illiberal elections are especially problematic. We do not find that current or recent armed conflict on a country’s territory makes elections more violent.
2014. Presidential and Media Leadership of Public Opinion on Iraq (with Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha). Foreign Policy Analysis. 10(4): 351-369.
Much research disputes the president's ability to lead public opinion and shows media to have influenced public opinion concerning the war in Iraq. We argue that although news tone is likely to have affected public support for the war, presidential rhetoric could be influential for two reasons. First, heightened presidential attention to the war increases the public's accessibility to the president's perspective on the war. Second, a survey question that cues the respondent to consider the president explicitly in their evaluation of the Iraq war is likely to encourage responsiveness to presidential rhetoric. To assess these arguments, we simultaneously examine the impact that presidential tone and media tone have on public support for the war in Iraq by analyzing an original dataset of presidential speeches, news coverage, and public support for the war and the president's handling of it from 2002 to 2008. Our findings reveal that although media tone drives public support for the war in Iraq, presidential tone influences the public's view of President Bush's handling of it.
2012. Social Conflict in Africa: A New Database (with Idean Salehyan, Cullen Hendrix, Christina Case, Emily Stull, and Jennifer Williams). International Interactions 38(4): 503–511.
We describe the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), a new event dataset for conducting research and analysis on various forms of social and political unrest in Africa. SCAD contains information on over 7,200 instances of protests, riots, strikes, government repression, communal violence, and other forms of unrest for 47 African countries from 1990–2010. SCAD includes information on event dates, actors and targets, lethality, georeferenced location information, and other conflict attributes. This article gives an overview of the data collection process, presents descriptive statistics and trends across the continent, and compares SCAD to the widely used Banks event data. We believe that SCAD will be a useful resource for scholars across multiple disciplines as well as for the policy community.
Book Chapters & Other Papers
2022. "Third Party Intervention, Duration, and Civil War Outcomes." What Do We Know About Civil War, Second Edition, T. David Mason and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (eds.) New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
2020 (June 30). "Why A Wall (Still) Won't Save Us." Political Violence @ a Glance.
2016. "Third Party Intervention, Duration, and Civil War Outcomes (with Andrew Enterline)." What Do We Know About Civil War?, T. David Mason and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (eds). New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
2013. "Elections and Social Conflict in Africa" (with Idean Salehyan). CCAPS Research Brief No. 6
2012. "Foreign Aid." (with Marijke Breuning). In Handbook of American Foreign Policy, Christopher Jones and Steven Hook (eds). New York: Routledge.
Dissertation
International Learning and the Spread of Civil Conflict
What explains the spread of civil conflict from country to country, even at great distances? Existing research relies primarily on explanations tied to geographic proximity, such as refugee flows and transnational ethnicity among neighboring states. However, this approach is unable to explain why civil conflict appears to spread across great geographic distances, and also neglects the government's role in conflict. For example, the American War of Independence (1775--83) ignited a wave of revolution and counter-revolution world-wide. To address this puzzle, my dissertation project formulates a theory of rebellion in which dissidents contemplating rebellion, and governments seeking to thwart it, learn about the utility of rebellion from information available in the global system. Together, these elements form the theoretical and empirical core of the domino theory, a concept popular in policy and media discussions during the Cold War. Given the recent invocation of the domino rhetoric by American policy-makers, obtaining a social-scientific understanding of the topic could not be timelier.
2023. "Counter-Insurgency Strategies and Transnational Attacks by Rebel Groups." (with Victor Asal, and J. Michael Greig. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.
International attacks by rebel groups are an historically important phenomenon. Yet, few scholars have sought to understand why some rebel organizations “go abroad” and commence international attacks and some do not. We theorize that a rebel group’s decision to attack internationally is partly the result of its home-state’s counter-insurgency strategy. Home-states that employ broad-based repression discourage rebels from engaging in international attacks. By contrast, home-states that employ narrowly targeted repression accelerate rebel decisions to attack internationally. Finally, concessions by the home-state are a sufficient condition for the rebel groups in our data to never attack internationally.
2023. "Forever Wars: Divided Government and the Termination of Interventions in Support of Civil War Governments." British Journal of Politics and International Relations.
Why do third-party states continue interventions in support of governments fighting civil wars even when continuing to do so appears futile from a military standpoint? To answer this question, we focus on third-party state domestic politics, theorising that institutional characteristics condition the likelihood that the third party will terminate support to a civil war government before a conflict ends. When a third-party state’s legislature and executive branches are controlled by opposing political parties, the third party’s executive is more likely to remain committed to an intervention in order to deny political opponents the opportunity to seize on the withdrawal as a basis for political advantage. To test this expectation, we assemble a data sample of third-party interventions in support of civil war governments during the period 1975–2009. The analysis suggests that the third-party divided government reduces the likelihood of an early termination of its support for a civil war government. Our analysis underscores the role of third-party domestic politics in understanding the dynamics of internationalised civil conflicts.
2022. "Why Do Leaders Build Walls? Domestic Politics, Leader Survival, and the Fortification of Borders." Journal of Conflict Resolution.
States around the world are fortifying their international borders at unprecedented rates. While only seven states had fortified their borders with walls or fences as of the end of World War Two, this number has now grown to more than 75. Why do states build walls on their international borders? While states may build walls to ameliorate the consequences of cross-border economic inequalities and to defend against transnational security threats, we suggest that another compelling logic stems from domestic politics and leaders’ desire to remain in office. Building on assumptions furnished by diversionary theory, we argue that national political leaders at risk of losing office are incentivized to implement popular policies, such as border wall construction, hoping that doing so will prompt a domestic rally effect. To test this argument, we assemble a global dataset of leader-years and find that politically insecure leaders are more likely to be seen to start and continue border wall construction.
Replication files: CLICK HERE.
2021. "Why Some Rebel Organizations Target Americans." (with Victor Asal, Amira Jadoon, and J. Michael Greig). Defence and Peace Economics.
Hating America – and attacking Americans – can seem like a mandatory activity for rebels; yet, only a minority of rebel groups actually harm Americans. Under what circumstances do rebel groups target Americans? To answer these questions, we leverage the Big Allied And Dangerous 2 data – Insurgency subsample (BAAD2-I). Our model focuses on two classes of rebel motives: direct and indirect. Direct motives are those in which Americans play a central role in rebel group grievances. They include ideology, deployment of American troops, and American support for rebels’ government-based opponents. Indirect motives are those that encourage anti-American attacks because of their powerful symbolic value. This distinction speaks to ongoing policy debates within the United States about the most effective policy instruments to defeat extremism abroad. Contrary to common perceptions, we find that attacks on Americans are unrelated to group ideology. Instead, deployment of American troops and military assistance is positively associated with attacks on Americans, as is economic penetration. Conversely, rebel groups in countries with substantial exports to the US or featuring a long-term presence of American cultural artifacts are less likely to attack Americans. Our findings highlight the value of a ‘soft power’ orientation in American foreign policy.
2021. "Playing the Ethnic Card: Diversion, Transborder Ethnic Ties, and Support for Rebel Movements." (with Benjamin Jones). Journal of Global Security Studies.
Under what circumstances do third-party states oppose governments that marginalize their ethnic kin in foreign civil conflicts? We argue that the effect of transborder ethnic ties on third-party support for rebel movements depends upon two factors: (1) a constellation of ethnic power relations in which an ethnicity with access to political power in a potential intervener but is marginalized in a civil conflict state; and (2), the political insecurity of leaders in a potential intervener. Said leaders facing a high probability of removal from office are willing to undertake risky foreign policies, including support for rebel movements, hoping that such actions will generate an ethnically-tinged rally effect. We draw upon the literature on diversionary theory to develop an empirical expectation. We then assemble a dataset of potential intervener-civil conflict state dyad-years to model this expectation. The political insecurity of leaders is measured with a variety of proxies. Our findings suggest that the well-known diversionary theory can be applied to a novel dependent variable, that of third-party state sponsorship of rebel movements.
Replication files: CLICK HERE.
2020. Teaching About Oppression and Rebellion: The "Peasants Are Revolting" Game. (with Victor Asal, Charmaine Willis, and Nakissa Jahanbani). PS: Political Science and Politics.
Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote that “Man is born free, but is everywhere in chains.” Whereas the former claim of the quote is contestable and gendered, the latter part is empirically true from slavery to economic exploitation and widespread oppression that occurs to this day. Nevertheless, history shows that rarely will people take up weapons and rebel against the powerful. We have found that students often do not understand why this should be the case, given the rights that all people deserve. We use the Peasant Game exercise in class to shine a light on why most people, most of the time, endure repression and choose not to rebel. The game is played in turns with some students as lords, who decide how “food” will be apportioned, and other students as peasants, who produce the food. We discuss how power differentials occur and the difference they make. Students who play the game come away with a better understanding of why many people decide not to fight back against oppression—even if it is the right thing to do.
2020. "Preventive Medicine: Domestic Repression and Foreign Revolutionary States." Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict.
Do governments repress in order to defend themselves against the threat posed by the geographic proximity of victorious rebel forces? I theorize that the victory of rebel forces in armed conflict, and the subsequent creation of a revolutionary regime, provides a model for mobilization to would-be rebels and that this, in turn, leads government authorities to deploy domestic repression in order to defend themselves. This relationship is conditional upon the international assertiveness of revolutionary regimes, as well as their geographic proximity to the threatened state. Revolutionary regimes that provide assistance to foreign rebels are regarded as more threatening by status-quo states, as are those that are geographically proximate. I undertake a data analysis of state-year patterns of repression and find significant support for my theoretical expectations. My findings have implications for the study of counter-revolution, supporting the notion that state repression is, in part, a function of international threat.
2020. "Electoral Integrity and Election-Related Conflict." (with Idean Salehyan). Democracy and Security.
Why are some elections contested with social unrest and protest – sometimes violent – while others pass with little conflict? We focus our study on two types of election, each of which is defined with respect to different types of fraud: “unfree elections,” or those in which elites manipulate electoral laws and institutions, and “unfair elections,” or those in which elites manipulate votes and voters during the campaign. Unfree elections are not correlated with conflict events because the effects of electoral law are felt diffusely and manipulated electoral law is a show of elite strength. Unfair elections, by contrast, provide a highly visible focal point that allows the opposition to mobilize while simultaneously signaling elite weakness. Finally, citizens form expectations about freeness and fairness over time, engaging in conflict behavior when they perceive a deterioration in electoral fairness. We test these expectations on a sample of African, Central American, and Caribbean states during the period 1990–2011. Our findings identify those types of election fraud most likely to correlate with election-related conflict and violence.
2020. Do walls work?: The effectiveness of border barriers in containing the cross-border spread of violent militancy. (with Alex Braithwaite). International Studies Quarterly.
Since the end of the Cold War, walls, fences, and other border fortifications have been constructed on interstate borders at a rapid rate. It remains unclear, however, whether these fortifications provide effective security. We explore whether border fortifications provide security against the international spread of violent militancy. Although barriers can reduce the likelihood that militant activity diffuses across international borders, their effectiveness is conditional upon the roughness of the terrain on which they are built and the level of infrastructure development in their proximity. Barriers require intensive manpower to monitor and patrol, and so conditions like rough terrain and poor infrastructure render security activity more difficult. However, rebels and other militants prefer to operate in such difficult areas, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of barriers in containing the international spread of violent militancy. Analyses on newly collated data on interstate border fortifications within a global sample of contiguous-state directed-dyad-years show that border fortifications are only effective in limiting the diffusion of militancy in contexts in which states can plausibly monitor and police their borders. This paper has significant implications for the academic literatures on national security and intrastate conflict, and it also speaks to the broader policy debate over border walls and fences.
2019. Curbing Enthusiasm? Democratic Third Parties and Commitment to Civil War Governments (with Andrew J. Enterline and Steven R. Liebel). Democracy and Security. DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2019.1675262.
Democracies are capable of committing exceptional resources toward interventions on behalf of governments threatened by
civil war. Yet, the security benefits obtained from interventions are often indirect, decisive outcomes remain elusive, and fatalities of military personnel salient to the public. These qualities of intervention can lead a democratic publics to pressure
political leaders to end to an intervention. To avoid these political costs while still pursuing foreign policy goals, democratic
policymakers may respond by altering their intervention strategy by shifting from the deployment of combat personnel
to less politically costly modes of support. To explore the possibility of this shift, we rely on the External Support
Project–Primary Warring Party Dataset to operationalize commitment during instances of third-party support of civil war
governments for the period 1975–2009. The analysis suggests that democracies engaged in intervention build commitment
over time. However, we find that democracies are reluctant to commit combat troops to an intervention and, if they do, are
unlikely to maintain this commitment. Instead, democratic third parties resort to other forms of support. In general, the
analysis demonstrates the key role of third-party domestic politics in interventions into civil wars.
2019. Keeping Threat at Arm's Length: Counter-Revolutionary Interventions by Third-Party States in Support of Governments (with Angela D. Nichols and Andrew J. Enterline). Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict. 12(3): 223--241.
During the 1970s the military juntas in South America engaged in a cross-national campaign of repression, code-named Operation Condor, targeted against leftist militant groups inspired to action by the Cuban Revolution. This case illustrates an understudied motivation for third-party intervention in domestic conflict: counter-revolution. We therefore formulate a theory in which revolutions shock the international system by empowering new revolutionary regimes that, in turn, inspire dissidents abroad to take up arms. Status quo elites in foreign states seek to staunch this diffusion of revolution by engaging in international repressive campaigns, manifested as third party intervention in civil conflict. We test this expectation on a global sample of intervention opportunities for the period 1975–2004, and assess the threat that revolutionary regimes pose to status quo governments in two ways: (1) the geographic proximity of a revolutionary state to pairs of status quo states; and (2) the geographic proximity of internal-armed conflicts featuring rebels that are supported by a revolutionary states. We find evidence that status quo states respond to the proximity of a revolutionary state, but not to the proximity of support for rebels.
2017. Shaken or stirred? Terrorism and third-party state resolve in civil war interventions (with Andrew J. Enterline and Steven R. Liebel). Conflict Management and Peace Science. DOI: 10.1177/0738894217740874.
Does terrorism against third-party state interveners affect their willingness to continue an intervention into a civil war? Drawing on research examining the impact of terrorism on partisanship, public opinion, and political survival, as well as the targeting of states by terrorists, we link terrorist attacks originating from a civil war state with an intervening state’s resolve to continue an ongoing military intervention into a civil war in support of the government. Terrorism can either undermine a third party’s resolve, because the political costs resulting from terror attacks are perceived to be larger than the national security benefits advertised in support of an intervention or it can fortify a third party’s resolve to continue an intervention because it produces a domestic rally effect that raises the political costs of early departure. Event history analysis of 127 interventions with military personnel into civil conflicts on the side of the government during the 1975–2005 period indicates that terrorist campaigns shake the resolve of third-party states and reduce time to their departure.
2017. Third Party State Domestic Politics & Conflict Management During Interventions into Civil Conflicts (with Andrew J. Enterline and Steven R. Liebel). Social Science Quarterly. DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12426
Objective: When do third party states engaged in military support of civil war governments resort to conflict management, such as negotiation or mediation, with rebels? Current research underemphasizes the role of third party state domestic conditions as precipitating the resort to conflict management. To do so, we formulate two explanations linking third party state domestic politics to conflict management with rebels: (1) gambling for resurrection, in which a weak third party state leader eschews conflict management in the pursuit of a victory that will rehabilitate their political survival; and (2) cutting losses, in which a weak third party leader resorts to conflict management to reduce the domestic political costs associated with continued fighting. Method: We identify a sample of 32 civil conflicts during the 1960–2004 period in which a third party state deploys troops to defend a central government against a rebellion. We code the timing of negotiation and mediation offers between the third-party and the rebels. We then rely on third party state economic conditions as a barometer of the political survival that shapes the third party’s resort to conflict management. Results: A logit analysis supports the cutting losses expectation that third party states seek conflict management when political survival at home is at risk. Conclusion: The analysis underscores the necessity of incorporating the domestic politics of third party states in studies of interventions into civil wars and conflict management attempts therein.
2016. Dangerous Lessons: Rebel Learning and Mobilization in the International System. Journal of Peace Research 53(5): 633-647.
Contemporary research on the international diffusion of civil conflict privileges physical, proximity-based variables like conflict spillover and refugee flows. I argue that the international diffusion of civil strife can occur through a learning mechanism, and that this phenomenon may occur on a worldwide basis. Individuals most likely to rebel, or proto-rebels, may learn about the utility of rebellion before mobilizing and violently challenging the state. Such international learning therefore occurs during the pre-conflict process. International sources by which proto-rebels learn include active, ongoing civil wars, as well as revolutionary governments that have been founded by rebels victorious in past wars. Revolutionary governments radically shock the international system, teaching proto-rebels about the possible benefits to be gained from violently challenging the state. In order to test these assertions, I undertake empirical analyses using militant organization data that capture the year in which rebel movements first emerge, during the period 1968–2001. I then explore the spatial and temporal relationships between rebel movement emergence, civil conflict, and revolutionary regimes, using the country-year as my unit of analysis. I further examine how these relationships are attenuated by cultural and regime-type similarity. I find, in line with the literature, that active civil conflicts generally inspire rebel mobilization only in directly neighboring states, while revolutionary regimes established after rebel victories are associated with mobilization on a global basis. I conclude that proto-rebels learn and take inspiration from some global sources of information, and that significant analytical utility is to be gained by focusing on revolutionary regimes established as a result of rebel victories, as well as mobilization in the pre-conflict process.
2015. Civil War Diffusion and the Emergence of Militant Groups, 1960-2001. International Interactions 43(3): 583-600.
In this research note, I argue that scholars of the international diffusion of civil conflict would benefit from directly measuring rebel mobilization prior to the onset of civil war. To better understand the way in which international processes facilitate dissidents overcoming the collective action problem inherent in rebellion, I focus on militant organizations and model the timing of their emergence. I use several datasets on militant groups and violent non-state actors, and rely on Buhaug and Gleditsch’s (2008) causal framework to examine how international conditions predict militant group emergence. While Buhaug and Gleditsch conclude that civil war diffusion is primarily a function of internal conflict in neighboring states, once militant group emergence is substituted in the dependent variable, I observe that global conditions affect rebel collective action. A final selection model links militant groups with civil conflict onset, and demonstrates the variable performance of diffusion effects. The results indicate that many rebels mobilize in response to more global events, and then escalate their behavior in response to local conditions.
Replication files (.ZIP archive containing do-file, log file, and data in .DTA format): click here to download
2015. Elections and Social Conflict in Africa, 1990-2009 (with Idean Salehyan). Studies in Comparative International Development. 50(1): 23-49.
Proponents of democratization often claim that liberal institutions have a palliative effect on the level of conflict within societies. Critics, however, suggest that the instruments of democracy, especially elections, can spark political violence, particularly in weakly institutionalized settings. Using the newly available Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), we examine the relationship between executive elections and social conflict in Africa for the period 1990–2009. We also assess the conditions which make elections more or less violent. We examine elections in (1) countries faced with armed conflict, (2) post-conflict settings, (3) elections in autocracies, and (4) in relatively poor countries. We also look at characteristics of elections themselves, including the margin of victory, the presence of observers, and allegations of vote fraud. Results show that while elections can sometimes spark violence, free and fair elections in genuinely democratic contexts are much less conflict prone, while illiberal elections are especially problematic. We do not find that current or recent armed conflict on a country’s territory makes elections more violent.
2014. Presidential and Media Leadership of Public Opinion on Iraq (with Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha). Foreign Policy Analysis. 10(4): 351-369.
Much research disputes the president's ability to lead public opinion and shows media to have influenced public opinion concerning the war in Iraq. We argue that although news tone is likely to have affected public support for the war, presidential rhetoric could be influential for two reasons. First, heightened presidential attention to the war increases the public's accessibility to the president's perspective on the war. Second, a survey question that cues the respondent to consider the president explicitly in their evaluation of the Iraq war is likely to encourage responsiveness to presidential rhetoric. To assess these arguments, we simultaneously examine the impact that presidential tone and media tone have on public support for the war in Iraq by analyzing an original dataset of presidential speeches, news coverage, and public support for the war and the president's handling of it from 2002 to 2008. Our findings reveal that although media tone drives public support for the war in Iraq, presidential tone influences the public's view of President Bush's handling of it.
2012. Social Conflict in Africa: A New Database (with Idean Salehyan, Cullen Hendrix, Christina Case, Emily Stull, and Jennifer Williams). International Interactions 38(4): 503–511.
We describe the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), a new event dataset for conducting research and analysis on various forms of social and political unrest in Africa. SCAD contains information on over 7,200 instances of protests, riots, strikes, government repression, communal violence, and other forms of unrest for 47 African countries from 1990–2010. SCAD includes information on event dates, actors and targets, lethality, georeferenced location information, and other conflict attributes. This article gives an overview of the data collection process, presents descriptive statistics and trends across the continent, and compares SCAD to the widely used Banks event data. We believe that SCAD will be a useful resource for scholars across multiple disciplines as well as for the policy community.
Book Chapters & Other Papers
2022. "Third Party Intervention, Duration, and Civil War Outcomes." What Do We Know About Civil War, Second Edition, T. David Mason and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (eds.) New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
2020 (June 30). "Why A Wall (Still) Won't Save Us." Political Violence @ a Glance.
2016. "Third Party Intervention, Duration, and Civil War Outcomes (with Andrew Enterline)." What Do We Know About Civil War?, T. David Mason and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (eds). New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
2013. "Elections and Social Conflict in Africa" (with Idean Salehyan). CCAPS Research Brief No. 6
2012. "Foreign Aid." (with Marijke Breuning). In Handbook of American Foreign Policy, Christopher Jones and Steven Hook (eds). New York: Routledge.
Dissertation
International Learning and the Spread of Civil Conflict
What explains the spread of civil conflict from country to country, even at great distances? Existing research relies primarily on explanations tied to geographic proximity, such as refugee flows and transnational ethnicity among neighboring states. However, this approach is unable to explain why civil conflict appears to spread across great geographic distances, and also neglects the government's role in conflict. For example, the American War of Independence (1775--83) ignited a wave of revolution and counter-revolution world-wide. To address this puzzle, my dissertation project formulates a theory of rebellion in which dissidents contemplating rebellion, and governments seeking to thwart it, learn about the utility of rebellion from information available in the global system. Together, these elements form the theoretical and empirical core of the domino theory, a concept popular in policy and media discussions during the Cold War. Given the recent invocation of the domino rhetoric by American policy-makers, obtaining a social-scientific understanding of the topic could not be timelier.